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Abstract Pekka Lahti is a prominent exponent of the renaissance of foundational
studies in quantum mechanics that has taken place during the last few decades.
Among other things, he and coworkers have drawn renewed attention to, and have
analyzed with fresh mathematical rigor, the threat of inconsistency at the basis of
quantum theory: ordinary measurement interactions, described within the mathemat-
ical formalism by Schrödinger-type equations of motion, seem to be unable to lead
to the occurrence of definite measurement outcomes, whereas the same formalism is
interpreted in terms of probabilities of precisely such definite outcomes. Of course,
it is essential here to be explicit about how definite measurement results (or definite
properties in general) should be represented in the formalism. To this end Lahti et al.
have introduced their objectification requirement that says that a system can be taken
to possess a definite property if it is certain (in the sense of probability 1) that this
property will be found upon measurement. As they have gone on to demonstrate, this
requirement entails that in general definite outcomes cannot arise in unitary measur-
ing processes.
In this paper we investigate whether it is possible to escape from this deadlock.
As we shall argue, there is a way out in which the objectification requirement is fully
maintained. The key idea is to adapt the notion of objectivity itself, by introducing re-
lational or perspectival properties. It seems that such a “relational perspective” offers
prospects of overcoming some of the long-standing problems in the interpretation of
quantum mechanics.
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1 Objectification
The last couple of decades have seen a renewed interest in foundational problems in
quantum mechanics; indeed, important parts of present-day cutting edge research in
physics owe their existence to this renaissance of foundational studies. The brunt of
the revival may be situated in the 1980s and was stimulated by a number of important
and timely conferences. Foremost among these were the Joensuu meetings on the
Foundations of Modern Physics [1–3] organized by Pekka Lahti. They, together with
the impressive monograph The Quantum Theory of Measurement by Busch, Lahti
and Mittelstaedt [4] defined the field and its problems to a considerable extent and set
the agenda for further research.
In The Quantum Theory of Measurement the authors review the measurement
problem, and the interpretation of quantum mechanics in general, on a new level of
logical and mathematical rigor. A central theme of their book is the problem of “ob-
jectification”: how does quantum theory deal with definite, objective, physical states
of affairs in the face of the ubiquity, on the theoretical level, of entangled states of the
Schrödinger cat type? On the basis of experience we require that successful measure-
ments lead to definite results, so that after the measurement a “pointer observable”
belonging to the measuring device possesses one unique and objective value. Is the
occurrence of such definite results compatible with the fact that the state of object
plus device after the measurement is generally entangled? In order to answer this
question we obviously need to know how definite properties are to be represented in
the formalism. Here Busch, Lahti and Mittelstaedt propose their objectification re-
quirement: a property of a system is definite and objective if and only if the system’s
quantum state is a mixture, in the ignorance sense, of eigenstates of the observable
corresponding to the property in question [4, p. 21]. In such a mixture, in which the
presence of different pure states as components reflects our lack of knowledge about
which one of these states actually obtains, there can evidently never be any effect of
interference between the components.
Now consider a measurement with an arbitrary initial object state. As already
noted, after such an interaction (described by unitary evolution) the final state of the
apparatus and the object will be entangled, which expresses the correlation brought
about between object and apparatus. Now, as Busch, Lahti and Mittelstaedt argue, if
there exists a specific pointer observable of the apparatus such that no interference
whatsoever can ever be found between different pointer eigenstates, this pointer ob-
servable must be classical, i.e. it must commute with all other apparatus observables.
But then an inconsistency arises [4, pp. 85–86]: If the pointer observable is classical,
it will also commute with the Hamiltonian generating the interaction, so that it cannot
change during this interaction. In other words, such a classical “pointer observable”
will not be able to correlate to any property of the object system; it cannot be a pointer
observable at all!
This no-go result reinforces the general result that mixed states derived from en-
tangled states by the technique of partial tracing (so-called improper mixtures) are
different from ignorance mixtures over pure states (proper mixtures). One could at-
tempt to argue nevertheless for an observational equivalence of entangled states and
such proper mixtures. This strategy would have to be based on the existence of supers-
election rules expressing classicality, but then the just-mentioned no-go result implies
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a conflict with the core idea of measurement, namely the possibility of establishing
correlations between a measuring device and an object.
It therefore follows that unitary measurement dynamics cannot lead to objective
pointer properties if this means that the final state must be a mixture in the sense of
the objectification requirement (or a state equivalent to such a mixture). As Busch,
Lahti and Mittelstaedt discuss [4, Chap. IV], one may respond to this situation in a
variety of ways. One may decide to opt for a hidden variable model, so that definite-
ness of properties of physical systems is built in from the very start; this of course
means renouncing the idea that quantum mechanics may be a fundamental and com-
plete theory. Alternatively, one may assume that the Schrödinger dynamics should
be modified, for example by assuming the occurrence of collapses in addition to the
unitary evolution. Collapses destroy the coherence between the terms in a superposi-
tion, so this option implies empirical differences, in principle, with unitary quantum
mechanics—a rather unpromising prospect in view of the ever-increasing empirical
evidence in favor of the existence of even macroscopic entanglement (see, e.g., [5]
and the references contained therein to a sample of recent experimental work).
A third way to go is to see whether it is possible to stay completely within the for-
malism of unitary quantum mechanics and nevertheless accommodate definite mea-
surement results (and definite properties in general). From the foregoing it is clear
that this strategy can only work if the objectification requirement in the exact form
mentioned above is dropped. It is this response to the objectification problem that we
shall now explore in some more detail. As we shall argue, the objectification require-
ment can consistently be maintained; but the price to pay is that the definite properties
satisfying this requirement must be assumed to have a relational character.
2 A Different Type of Objectivity
The core of the objectification requirement is the idea that a system can be concluded
to possesses a certain property if a yes-no measurement of that property leads to a
positive answer with certainty, i.e. with probability 1 [4, p. 21]. Of course, we are
speaking of ideal measurements here, non-intrusive and not subject to inaccuracy.
It is also assumed that all possible properties correspond to quantum mechanical ob-
servables. With these provisos the idea behind the objectification requirement appears
eminently reasonable. It might perhaps be objected that there is an operationalist fla-
vor to it; but this would be off target, since there is no demand here that the mea-
surements in question are feasible in actual practice—the requirement is about what
the formalism predicts for the expectation values of theoretically defined observables.
Moreover, the requirement is a criterion for testing the presence of objective proper-
ties rather than a verificationist definition of properties.
Another type of doubt might arise as follows. Consider the following completely
classical situation. I know that a die will be cast in another room, and I also know
that my friend, who is in that room and who is a perfect observer, will be watching
the outcome closely. After some time I shall be sure that the experiment is over and
that my friend will have observed a definite result. Still, I possess no certainty about
the outcome: if I know that the die is fair I can express this knowledge by assigning
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a probability of 1/6 to all possible situations (consisting of a particular outcome plus
my friend having noted that outcome). So it seems that probability 1 and objectivity
of possessed properties do not necessarily go hand in hand.
This argument does not yield an objection to the objectification requirement,
however—at least not in the context of classical physics. It is precisely because of
this type of situation that the requirement was formulated in terms of ignorance mix-
tures. Indeed, because I stand outside the room in which the experiment takes place,
I happen to be blocked from direct access to observables pertaining to what is going
on inside, so that I remain ignorant about the actual situation. My probability assign-
ments of 1/6 represent this ignorance. But there exist other observables than the ones
I have direct access to that do lead to a definite result with probability 1, given the
condition of the die after the roll. These are precisely the observables that my friend,
inside the room, is measuring. According to classical physics nothing will change
in the state of the room or the die when I make my way in cautiously enough and
take cognizance of the outcome—it is only my knowledge that then changes. In other
words, the objectification requirement does not need to refer only to the information
that is actually available to the outside observer—one may also appeal to knowledge
the observer could obtain without disturbing the system.
Within the framework of classical physical ideas the conclusion that both for me
and my friend the same properties of the die are definite is consequently perfectly
reasonable. Still, this conclusion depends on assumptions that cannot pretend to be
valid a priori, but depend on the applicable physics. Even if it is granted that if I enter
the room and look at the die I shall find a definite outcome, and that my friend will tell
me that this outcome was there all along, this does not compel me logically to accept
that this property is also objective for me now, standing outside and not performing
any measurement. At least by way of a thought experiment I could contemplate the
conceptual possibility that for me the situation in the room is really undecided, objec-
tively “hovering between” the different outcomes; or as being in a state that should
not be described in terms of outcomes at all. Admittedly this suggestion seems rather
weird, in particular when we take into account the situation of my friend who is inside
the room. It should be acknowledged that my friend at a certain point in time becomes
aware of a definite outcome, and is not undecidedly hovering between possibilities at
all. Is this not a direct refutation of the hypothesis according to which things in the
room are undecided?
No such refutation results if we complicate our thought experiment further. As-
sume, at this point just for argument’s sake, that we are going to describe the situa-
tion in and outside the room not with the usual physical properties that characterize
objects as they are in themselves, but rather in terms of relational properties. That is,
instead of saying that the die has landed on a particular face tout court, we are think-
ing of the possibility that this is the case with respect to my friend who has watched
the roll of the die. And instead of simply saying that the room and its contents do not
possess a property corresponding to a definite outcome, we are now going to say that
this is so with respect to me as outside observer who has not interacted with what
is inside. With this relativization manoeuvre logical contradiction can be avoided:
“there is a definite outcome” could be true for the inside observer, “there is no defi-
nite outcome” could be true for the outside observer, whereas a contradiction would
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require both the presence and absence of definiteness for one and the same observer.
In this scenario I as an outside observer could admit that for my friend the roll of the
die has ended in some definite outcome, while at the same time maintaining that for
me the state of die plus friend is completely different, not describable as an ignorance
mixture of definite outcomes at all. The objectification that has taken place for my
friend is in this case not represented by an ignorance mixture over states with respect
to me, but by an ignorance mixture of the states for my friend that I consider possible
(of course, since I am shut off from the experiment, I do not know what my friend
has seen).
In the context of classical physics this proposal would boil down to accepting the
objectification requirement in an implausibly strong form, namely that if I cannot
actually make a prediction with probability 1 about the presence of a property, this
property is not there. We have already pointed out that this version of the require-
ment is unduly strict, and the formulation of the requirement in [4] indeed allowed
that such an impossibility of actually making certain predictions could be due to mere
ignorance, i.e. an ontologically insignificant lack of knowledge about the real situa-
tion.
Going this way in the case of our example would lead to a much more complicated
description than the usual one. Although it is true that such a perspectival description
could be consistently maintained even within the context of classical physics, there
is no physical reason to actually do so—as already emphasized, classical physical
theory says that it makes no difference for the room if I enter and make (perfectly
gentle, ideal) observations. The description available to my friend can therefore be
considered valid for me too. It would complicate matters enormously if all physical
laws in such cases had to be reformulated in terms of relational properties, without
there being any compensation in the way of better or more predictions. The only
motivation to engage in such a move would be philosophical, for example a desire to
indulge in skeptical or verificationist predilections.
This is not to say that relational properties have no place at all in classical physics.
The obvious counterexample are the length and time determinations of special relativ-
ity, which vary with the inertial frame of reference from which they are made. In fact,
awareness that these and similar instances of relational properties already occur in
classical physics may help to make our later introduction of perspectivalism in quan-
tum theory more palatable. Still, there is a difference between these well-known cases
of perspectivalism and the one considered in our discussion of the gambling experi-
ment. In the latter case the perspective decided whether or not the die had landed on
a definite face at all; whereas the different descriptions given from different frames
in special relativity pertain to different numerical values characterizing a situation
that is definite as judged from all frames. In the case of the Lorentz contraction, for
example, all observers agree that a moving rod possesses a definite length; but they
differ on the value to be ascribed to this length. Likewise, in relativity observers may
disagree about the sizes of the faces of our die and its distance to other objects, but
not about whether the faces have sizes at all or about whether the die has landed—
or will land—on a definite face at all. The perspectivalism considered above, in the
discussion of what is going on inside the room, is therefore really thoroughgoing, of
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a more dramatic kind than classical perspectivalism. No wonder that the philosoph-
ical and epistemological motivations that we mentioned do not suffice to justify the
introduction of this kind of perspectivalism in classical physical theory.
But in quantum mechanics the situation becomes different. Think back of the von
Neumann measurement scheme, applied to a situation like the above die experiment.
The quantum equations of motion tell us that after the conclusion of the measurement
interaction the state of my friend plus die will be given by a linear superposition of
terms each of which will be a product of a die state with a definite face-up and a
friend state representing awareness of that same definite face. Also experience seems
to support the ascription of this superposed state: as we have pointed out before,
experiments on so-called Schrödinger cat states definitely indicate that superpositions
are needed to do justice to the experimental facts [5]. Accordingly, if I, standing
outside the room, wish to make predictions about the results of measurements on the
room I had better use the full superposition. In particular, if I am going to measure the
projection operator |〉〈| (where |〉 stands for the superposed state of the room
and its contents), the formalism tells me that I shall find the result “1” with certainty.
The objectification requirement thus leads me to consider the corresponding physical
property as objectively belonging to the room. Now, experience also tells me that
during the experiment my friend becomes aware of exactly one result; for him the
process certainly ends with a definite die property. Furthermore, my friend can predict
with certainty, after having noted the face the die has landed on, what subsequent
looks at the die will show. Therefore, application of the objectification requirement
in his case will lead to the attribution of a definite-face state to the die. I, on the
other hand, can only derive a mixed state for the die from my superposition for the
total room, and well-known arguments forbid me to think that this mixture is an
ontologically insignificant ignorance mixture (indeed, if the die actually were in one
of the component states of the mixture, the total system would have to be a mixture
as well, which conflicts with the assumption that the total state is a superposition).
In other words, quantum mechanics makes it physically plausible to ascribe more
than one state to the same physical system. The contradiction that looms can be
avoided if we drop the implicit assumption that only one state can belong to any ob-
ject; in other words, if we decide to assign relational or perspectival states, i.e. states
of a physical system A from the perspective of a physical system B . This manoeuvre
creates room for the possibility that the state and physical properties of a system A
are different from different perspectives. Consequently, a reconciliation between the
unitary evolution that takes place during a quantum measurement and the occurrence
of definite outcomes is perhaps no longer out of the question: the properties associ-
ated with the superposition and the definite outcomes, respectively, could relate to
two different perspectives.
The significant difference between the classical and the quantum cases is that in
the latter there are physical, empirical reasons for investigating the viability of work-
ing with relational properties of this drastic kind. By contrast, in the classical case
physics favors the simpler picture of monadic (i.e. non-relational) states and proper-
ties.
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3 A Quantum Scheme for Attributing Perspectival States
The foregoing sections offered a motivation for introducing perspectival states, but
this should evidently be supplemented by a more precise account that makes it clear
what these new states are and in what way they relate to the standard formalism of
quantum mechanics. As it turns out, proposals are already available in the literature;
in particular, a recent relational version of the modal interpretation [6] captures the
above intuitions very well. There are also other—though similar—proposals in the
literature [7–10], see also [11, 12], with which we should compare. But let us first
reformulate the ideas from [6] for our present purposes.
Our point of departure is the standard Hilbert space formalism of quantum me-
chanics with only unitary time evolution (as governed by equations of motion of the
Schrödinger-type). We assume the universal validity of quantum mechanics, so there
is no division of the world in a classical and a quantum part. Within this framework
it is not problematic, in principle, to speak about the quantum state of the whole
universe; we assume this state to be a pure vector state |〉.
Our task is now to assign states to smaller systems S, components of the whole uni-
verse U . These states will in general be density operators, i.e., positive semi-definite
and unit-trace Hermitian operators acting on the Hilbert space of S: ρSR . The upper
and lower indices attached to ρ anticipate that in our approach the state of a physical
system S needs the specification of another system, the “reference system” R, with
respect to which the state is defined: ρSR is the state of S with respect to R. As ex-
plained in the previous section, we wish to create room for the possibility that one
and the same system, at one and the same instant of time, has different states with
respect to different reference systems.
An important special case is the one in which R coincides with S: the state of S
with respect to itself. This state we define as one of the projectors occurring in the
spectral decomposition of the reduced density operator of S in the standard formal-
ism, i.e. the density operator that is obtained for S by partial tracing from |〉〈|. In
other words, ρSS follows from |〉〈| by “tracing out” over all degrees of freedom
not pertaining to S. If there is no degeneracy, this state will be a one-dimensional
projector
ρSS = |ψS〉〈ψS |, (1)
or equivalently a vector state |ψS〉. In accordance with the ideas of modal interpreta-
tions [13–17], we posit that which projector from the spectral decomposition of S’s
reduced density operator is ρSS is not fixed by quantum mechanics; the theory only
specifies probabilities (namely, the usual Born probabilities) for the various possibili-
ties. Also in accordance with modal ideas is that we assume this state ρSS , the “state of
S with respect to itself”, to codify the physical properties S actually has (i.e. the quan-
tities that possess definite values): all operators of which |ψS〉 is an eigenvector have
the corresponding definite value or, put differently, the observable |ψS〉〈ψS | = ρSS
possesses the definite value 1. These properties, since they are derived from the state
of S with respect to itself, are interpreted as properties possessed by S “on its own”,
without reference to anything external.
So far, there is nothing explicitly relational or perspectival going on; |ψS〉 is just
the “physical state” assigned to S in earlier versions of the modal interpretation of
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quantum mechanics [14]. The relational aspect enters when we consider states ρSR for
arbitrary S and R.
We are interested in situations in which there is a reference system, R, outside S,
such that A ≡ U \ R contains S. By virtue of the Schmidt decomposition of |〉〈|
(the state of the universe), there is a unique state ρAA that is coupled to ρRR (in the
sense of being perfectly correlated to it via |〉’s Schmidt decomposition). Again
in accordance with earlier modal ideas, we posit that this correlated state ρAA is A’s
state with respect to itself given R’s state ρRR . Now, since system S is contained in A
(remember: A = U \ R), the state ρSR can be defined as the density operator that
follows from this ρAA by taking the partial trace over the degrees of freedom in A that
do not pertain to S:
ρSR = TrA\SρAA. (2)
Any relational state of a system with respect to another system, outside of it, can be
determined by means of (2).
So for an arbitrary system S contained in the universe U , ρSS is one of the pro-jectors occurring in the spectral resolution of TrU\S |〉〈|. If there is no degeneracy
among the eigenvalues of this density operator these projectors are one-dimensional
and the state can be represented by a vector |ψS〉, see (1). In the case of degener-
acy this generalizes: now, the state of the system with respect to itself becomes a
multi-dimensional projector [17]. For simplicity we shall in the following focus on
the non-degenerate case. One-to-one coupled with ρSS , via the correlation represented
in the Schmidt decomposition, is a state ρRR of the rest of the universe U . The state
attribution rule of the foregoing paragraph says that the relational state of a compo-
nent C of S, with respect to R, ρCR , is found from ρ
S
S by tracing out the degrees of
freedom not belonging to C.
The state |〉 evolves unitarily in time. Because there is no collapse of the wave
function in our approach, this unitary evolution of |〉 is the main dynamical principle
of the theory. Furthermore, we assume that the state assigned to a closed system S











For more about the dynamics, (joint) probabilities and other details, see [6, 17].
Here we intend to focus on the relational aspects of the just-introduced scheme of
state attribution. These can be illustrated by looking at how this scheme works for the
case of the gambling experiment from the previous section.
4 The Quantum World of Perspectives
The essential points are not affected if we simplify by taking the universe U to consist
of only three systems: I (or a measuring device, initially not partaking in the interac-
tion), the die, and “my friend” (a measuring device recording the outcome of the die
roll), denoted by I , D and F , respectively. Let us take the initial state |〉 as a prod-
uct state: |〉 = |I0〉 ⊗ |D0〉 ⊗ |F0〉, with |D0〉 = ∑ ci |Di〉, where the states |Di〉 are
768 Found Phys (2009) 39: 760–775
eigenstates of the observable corresponding to “face i coming up”. Using the familiar
von Neumann measurement scheme we can represent the first stage of the experiment
(in which the die is rolled and my friend looks at the outcome) as follows:
|I0〉 ⊗ |D0〉 ⊗ |F0〉 −→ |I0〉 ⊗
∑
ci |Di〉 ⊗ |Fi〉. (4)
This may be followed by a second stage, in which I receive information about the
outcome. In the same von Neumann style (which is obviously highly idealized and




ci |Di〉 ⊗ |Fi〉 −→
∑
ci |Ii〉 ⊗ |Di〉 ⊗ |Fi〉; (5)
with obvious notation both in (4) and (5)—the states with different values of i are
mutually orthogonal.
We can now apply the rules of the previous section to the states occurring in (4)
and (5) in order to determine what the properties of the various component systems
are. Looking at the final state in (4), we see that F by itself has registered a definite
result i and also that D by itself has landed with a definite face up (possibility i = k
being realized with probability |ck|2). The state of I is, as expected, as it was before
the experiment started, since I has not been involved in the process. The state of D
plus F for I is given by ∑ ci |Di〉 ⊗ |Fi〉, from which it follows that the state of F
for I is the improper mixture ∑ |ci |2|Fi〉〈Fi |; and analogously for the state of D with
respect to I . So clearly, the states of D and F vary depending on the reference system
with respect to which they are defined: they are different when taken with respect to
the systems themselves from when taken with respect to I . The result reproduces
what was discussed in the previous section: after the die has been cast there is a clear-
cut outcome of the experiment for my friend, whereas for me the situation is still
objectively undecided. The latter statement should not be interpreted in the sense that
I do not know what the outcome has been, but rather as expressing that with respect to
me the die does not possess a well-defined position showing a definite face. Indeed,
with respect to me
∑ |ci |2|Di〉〈Di | is the state of the die. Taking our clue from the
“objectification requirement” in answering the question to which definite physical
property this state corresponds (in other words, looking for a projector P such that
TrρP = ∑ |ci |2〈Di |P |Di〉 = 1), we readily find that the projector ∑ |Di〉〈Di | is
definite but that the individual projectors |Di〉 are not.
But this becomes different when I enter into interaction with either the die, my
friend, or both. During this new interaction the total state changes, with the right-
hand side of (5) as the final result. At the end of this process I will have recorded
a definite result: my state with respect to myself has become one of the states |Ii〉.
With respect to me, the state of my friend plus the die will now be given by the
corresponding |Di〉 ⊗ |Fi〉, from which it follows that with respect to me the die has
acquired a definite face-up position.
The state attribution scheme under discussion thus yields the type of relational
states that a philosophical skeptic or verificationist would perhaps already be inclined
to assign even in the context of classical physics. But again, the salient point is that
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in the context of quantum theory this way of attributing states has empirical conse-
quences and corresponding empirical support: we may take it as supported by experi-
ment that measurements performed by I on the composite D plus F system, after the
die has been cast but before any further interaction with I has taken place (so that the
state is given by (4)), can generally be successfully described only if the entangled
state
∑
ci |Di〉⊗ |Fi〉 is used instead of one of the “definite result states” |Di〉⊗ |Fi〉.
We thus find that a relational description of the world, in the sense that the state
and physical properties of any physical system depend on a reference system with
respect to which they are defined, is implicitly present in the formalism of quantum
mechanics. There is certainly some affinity here with the many-worlds or relative-
state interpretation of quantum mechanics. One important point of difference is that
we have not been assuming that all possible outcomes of experiments are equally
realized; we have taken the modal point of view that only one result becomes ac-
tual and that quantum theory only contains probabilistic information about which
result that will be. In this and other respects our proposals are akin to those made by
Rovelli [7–9]. However, before going into a comparison with his “relational quan-
tum mechanics”, let us look at some more characteristics of the relational perspective
developed above.
5 Holism, Locality and EPR
One of central themes in discussions about the interpretation of quantum mechanics
is that of holism: it seems generally accepted today that quantum mechanics contains
holistic features. Various types of holism have been distinguished in the literature, but
the most important one relates directly to the existence of entangled states. Indeed,
in a state like
∑
ci |Di〉 ⊗ |Fi〉 the whole system, comprising D and F , physical
properties appear to be instantiated that cannot be understood as being “built up”
from properties of the individual component systems. A paradigmatic example is
that of definite and fixed correlations between component systems, represented by
well-defined fixed values of global quantities, in spite of the fact that the component
systems do not possess fixed values for the correlated quantities. In the notorious case
of the singlet spin state there is a perfect anti-correlation between the spins, following
from the fact that the total spin has the definite value 0, whereas there are no definite
individual spin values. In situations in which the component systems can be thought
of as being at a large spatial distance from each other, this holistic feature manifests
itself in the guise of non-locality.
We can use the results of the previous section to discuss this issue for the case
of our gambling experiment. After the initial stage of the experiment the combined
system of D and F is for I in an entangled pure state, whereas the states, again for I ,
of the component systems are improper mixtures. The associated physical properties
are represented by the projector on the entangled state in the case of the total system,
and by the rather uninformative projectors of the form ∑ |Di〉〈Di | in the case of the
component states. So from the perspective of I the total system indeed has proper-
ties that cannot be understood as constructed from the properties of the components:
a manifestation of holism. From the point of view of F , however, there is nothing
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holistic: the die has landed on a definite side, this has been recorded by F , and the
total system is characterized by the conjunction of these properties. So whether or
not a system displays holistic features becomes itself a perspectival matter in this
approach.
An important question is whether the holism that is present gives rise to non-
locality in cases in which the component systems are spatially separated. In one
sense of the question the answer is evident: if the properties of a spatially extended
system do not supervene on the properties of the individual localized parts, there
is non-locality in exactly this meaning of the term. But we are more interested in
another question, namely whether in EPR-like situations it can be said that there
are instantaneous—or faster-than-light—influences going from one part of the total
system to another. It is this meaning of non-locality that is usually discussed in the
context of debates concerning the implications of violations of Bell inequalities.
The essential features of the EPR case are already present in our gambling thought
experiment. After the rolling of the die the state of D plus F is entangled, with the
consequence that for I there is no definite face that has come up. However, if I looks
at the die (and thus enters in interaction with it) the die will acquire such a definite
face-up state for I , as is clear from (5). This offers no problem for locality, of course:
the interaction between I and D can be assumed to be purely local. However, as a
result of this same interaction the state of F for I also changes—namely into a state
telling us that F had already observed the same outcome as I is observing now. This
change of F ’s state with respect to I takes place without any causal contact between
I and F . Appearances therefore are that there is some strange influence on F arising
from the interaction between I and D; it is exactly this effect that translates into a
non-local influence in the case of spatially separated systems.
But a more careful consideration of the relational character of the states takes
away the impression of mystery here. It is true that there is no physical interaction
between I and F , and that in this sense I ’s observation of D cannot have an effect
on F ’s state. However, I ’s own state is modified during the (purely local) interaction
with D, and since we are considering the state of F with respect to I , it need not
cause bewilderment that this relational state also becomes different from what it was.
As a result of I ’s looking at the die, I ’s state by itself becomes aligned with D’s state
by itself (cf. (5)); it is therefore no wonder that F ’s state with respect to I becomes
the same as it already was with respect to D. We do not need to invoke any non-local
influences here: the changes in the various states can be understood on the basis of the
combination of local physical interactions and the relational character of the states.
This line of reasoning carries over directly to the case of the EPR experiment—
see [6]. Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen famously proposed that if, without in any way
disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to
unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality
corresponding to this physical quantity [18]. We can accept this criterion within our
relational framework—in its essence, it is the objectification requirement discussed
before—but here its application does not lead to the conclusion that for I the proper-
ties of F were already before the experiment what they are after I ’s interaction with
D. The crux of the matter is that in spite of the absence of physical disturbances go-
ing from I to F , there does exist an influence of the observation of D. This influence
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comes about via the relational, perspectival, character of the state we are consider-
ing: it is a state of F with respect to I , which makes the local change in I relevant.
The premiss that this relational state of F is not “in any way disturbed” during the
experiment is thus not fulfilled.
More in general, the perspectival character of the states is responsible for the fail-
ure of counterfactual reasoning in the way we are used to it: from the fact that no
physical disturbance has affected an object, it cannot always be concluded that the
object state is the same as it would have been if no interactions at all had been present.
One should also look at the reference system, with respect to which the state is de-
fined, and see whether anything has changed there that is relevant.
These considerations show the extent to which the very concept of reality is mod-
ified in this perspectival approach to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. How-
ever, to a point the quantum formalism itself hides these relational features from view.
Indeed, when different observers compare their findings, they will agree on what they
have seen, as is illustrated by the agreement between I and F about the outcome of
rolling the die. This is a general feature of the formalism [6]. Furthermore, there are
the omnipresent effects of decoherence that will blur the observability of entangle-
ment. Yet, in principle the existence of superpositions (as in the case of the state of D
and F before I has taken a look at the D) can be found out experimentally, even in
the macroscopic domain. In fact, the violation of Bell inequalities can be interpreted
as empirical support for the thesis that the traditional notion of reality (monadic prop-
erties combined with locality) is inappropriate.
Let us for clarity’s sake look explicitly at the EPR case of distant correlated par-
ticles. We find that the state of the second particle that becomes known after a mea-
surement on the first particle is the state of this second particle from the perspective
of the measuring device that has interacted with particle 1. However, it cannot be con-
cluded that this state was already present before the measurement, because the state
of the measuring device with respect to itself changes during the measurement. If
one writes down the states explicitly, applying the given rules to the situations before
and after the measurement, one easily establishes that the relational state of particle 2
with respect to the measuring device at the position of particle 1 indeed changes as
a result of the measurement, in spite of the fact that there was no mechanical distur-
bance propagating between 1 and 2. It is important to note that, by contrast, the state
of particle 2 with respect to itself does not change—this is a direct consequence of
the no-signalling theorem.
The modification of the reality concept that is inherent in the introduction of rela-
tional (perspectival) states thus appears to make the introduction of ‘quantum nonlo-
cality’ unnecessary. The change in the relational state of particle 2 can be understood
as a consequence of the local change in the reference system, brought about by the
measurement interaction. One could express it like this: the local measurement in-
teraction is responsible for the creation of a new perspective (namely the perspective
connected with the new state of the measuring device), and from this new perspective
even far-away systems look differently.
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6 A Brief Survey of Relational Ideas
The idea that quantum theory points into the direction of perspectivalism is certainly
not new. Some of the basic thoughts can already be recognized in Bohr’s writings,
in particular in his complementarity doctrine. Bohr emphasized that quantum objects
cannot be characterized by a fixed set of physical magnitudes that are definite-valued
at all times; instead, which properties can be attributed to quantum objects depends
on the experimental set-up of which the object is a part. According to Bohr this ex-
perimental context should not be interpreted in terms of the presence of conscious
observers; it is rather the presence of a measuring device measuring an observable
A that makes it possible to speak about an object in terms of A-values. So it is the
nature of the physical interaction between the object and the system with which it is
in interaction and with which it establishes correlations that determines the validity
of property ascriptions—for example, whether momentum or position values can be
properly ascribed.1 There is clearly a similarity here to some of the features of the
approach explained in the foregoing sections here. However, one should be very care-
ful in attributing to Bohr (or any other author) ideas that are not formulated explicitly
by himself; and although it seems plausible to interpret Bohr’s statements in terms
of relational property ascriptions, he has never mentioned the possibility of different
property ascriptions to one system depending on the perspective that is taken.
Kochen in [10] has proposed an interpretation of quantum mechanics that he dubs
the “witnessing” interpretation, which strongly suggests that it is about properties of
systems as “witnessed” or viewed from other systems—this seems an example of the
explicit introduction of perspectival properties. However, in Kochen’s only published
paper on the subject there is only a discussion of a physical system consisting of two
components, in which case the Schmidt decomposition of the total state (cf. Sect. 3
above) is used to assign properties to these components. This makes the witnessing
interpretation identical, for this particular case, to a version of the modal interpreta-
tion [13, 14, 16]. Since there is neither mention of other systems in Kochen’s proposal
nor discussion of its supposedly perspectival nature, it is difficult to be certain about
what the meaning and the relevance of the “witnessing relation” is.
This is very different in the work of Rovelli and coworkers, who propose an ex-
plicit Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) and emphasize the possibility of dif-
ferent descriptions of a physical system depending on the perspective [7–9, 20]. The
spirit of RQM, in particular the central idea that quantum systems have states and
properties that are defined relatively to reference systems, is very similar to what
was discussed in the foregoing sections. It appears that there are also a number of
differences, although it remains to be seen how important these are.
1Bohr stressed that measuring devices are macroscopic, and this has sometimes created the misunder-
standing that Bohr thought that these devices were themselves not subject to quantum mechanics. Bohr
has mentioned in several places, however, that these macroscopic objects should be treated by quantum
mechanics if we want to make predictions about measurements performed on them—see, e.g., [19]. The
invocation of the macroscopicity of the devices serves the purpose of making contact with experience and
ordinary language, by referring to situations in which the concepts of classical physics, like position and
momentum, are applicable.
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In Relational Quantum Mechanics the concept of measurement interactions, and
definite outcomes of measurements, is primary; the state |ψ〉 is introduced as a deriv-
ative quantity, a bookkeeping device that takes into account the information about
previous interactions with a system S that has been stored in a system A and can be
used for making predictions. As Smerlak and Rovelli write [9]: “The state ψ that we
associate with a system S is therefore, first of all, just a coding of the outcome of
these previous interactions with S. Since these are actual only with respect to A, the
state ψ is only relative to A: ψ is the coding of the information that A has about S.
Because of this irreducible epistemic character, ψ is but a relative state, which can-
not be taken to be an objective property of the single system S, independent from A.
Every state of quantum theory is a relative state”. Smerlak and Rovelli append a foot-
note to this, saying “From this perspective, probability needs clearly to be interpreted
subjectively”. The basic idea of perspectivalism in RQM seems thus to be motivated
by epistemological or operationalistic considerations (there are indeed references to
operational definitions and operationally justified procedures elsewhere in the same
paper). But it would be a mistake to read too much into this, since the papers [7–9]
make it also clear that “measurements” are here meant not in the sense of human
acts, but rather as physical interactions that give rise to correlations between physical
systems. Moreover, all physical systems are treated as quantum systems: quantum
theory is taken to be universally applicable, both to microscopic and macroscopic
systems. In these latter points there is complete agreement with our proposals from
the foregoing sections. However, the first point—the primary role played by “mea-
surement results” and the derivative role of ψ—gives rise to differences with modal
approaches.
Since the occurrence of definite events (as registered by some physical system) is
taken as primary in RQM, and since the bookkeeping device ψ has to be updated
every time such an event occurs, ψ changes discontinuously with every new event.
As the authors of [9] say, “the state ψ is a tool that can be used by A to predict future
outcomes of interactions between S and A. In general these predictions depend on the
time t at which the interaction will take place. In the Schrödinger picture this time
dependence is coded into a time evolution of the state ψ itself. In this picture, there
are therefore two distinct manners in which ψ can evolve: (i) in a discrete way, when
S and A interact, in order for the information to be adjusted, and (ii) in a continuous
way, to reflect the time dependence of the probabilistic relation between past and fu-
ture events”. By contrast, according to modal interpretational ideas unitary evolution
is the main dynamical principle, also when systems interact. Whether or not definite
events occur, and what their characteristics are, is in the modal interpretation (which
was on the background of our perspectival proposals in the foregoing) derived from
the form of —instead of the other way around as in RQM. It may be true, however,
that on the level of the physical properties that become realized over time (which
process is treated in general as stochastic in the modal interpretation) continuity can-
not always be guaranteed even in the modal scheme. The extent and the significance
of the differences here therefore remain a question for further investigation.
In RQM all states are relative to some other system, there is no mention of states
of systems with respect to themselves. A fortiori, RQM does not operate with the
notion of a state of the whole universe U . Nevertheless, it seems that in cases like the
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gambling experiment from Sect. 2, RQM leads to the same relational state attributions
as derived in Sect. 3: the “information” mentioned in RQM is both in RQM and in the
modal scheme represented by the correlations between the systems, as encoded in the
entangled states. It is less clear whether the state assignments agree in cases in which
there is space-like separation between systems S and A, and in which no information
about S has arrived at A from the past. It seems that in such cases RQM says that
it makes no sense to speak of the state of B with respect to A: A cannot “know”
anything about B [9]. In our proposal, in which we started from the assumption that
there exists a well-defined state of the total universe  , such a state of S with respect
to A is well-defined. More generally, it appears that RQM defines less properties and
states than are assigned in our proposal: according to RQM the attribution of a state
of S relative to A becomes meaningless as soon as no actual information transfer has
taken place in any way between S and A.
Obviously, there is a lot more to say about this and other topics (like the way
EPR is dealt with in the different approaches). But for the purpose of this paper
it is enough to conclude that the idea of perspectival properties makes it possible
to give a new twist to many an old debate in the foundations and interpretation of
quantum mechanics, and that a new field of detailed questions is opened up by this
development.
7 Conclusion
Interpreting quantum mechanics via perspectival (relational) properties seems a
promising way to go. One important result is that the relational perspective sheds
new light on the long-standing locality debate: within a relational framework locality
in quantum mechanics does not need to be jettisoned. The price to pay is that the
nature of reality becomes different from what we were used to: all properties need a
perspective for their definition. This is admittedly strange and far-fetched if judged
from a classical point of view. But it is not a gratuitous philosophical suggestion: the
very structure of the quantum formalism points in this direction. If reality is conceived
of in this perspectival way, local realism seems to become a live option again.
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